It may be optimal from a welfare perspective to use R&D subsidies when the source of R&D distortions originates from the surplus appropriability problem and technological spillovers in the form of knowledge spillovers, creative destruction, and duplication externalities are absent. Hence, R&D subsidies may constitute the welfare maximizing policy even when subsidies directly targeted on monopoly pricing could be applied. The result holds when dynamic gains are important relative to static gains and when government spending is restricted, i.e., below the required effort for correcting completely for market failures. The argument is developed in a semi-endogenous growth model where the only distortion is monopoly pricing of intermediate goods.
Introduction
This paper addresses welfare e ects of government policies using a semi-endogenous growth model. From a welfare perspective, it may be optimal to subsidize R&D activities when the source of R&D distortions mainly originates from the surplus appropriability problem. 1 This is the case even when the direct instrument is targeted at production of goods created by innovation activities. The result holds when two conditions are satisfied: dynamic gains are important relative to static gains and government spending is restricted, i.e., below the required e ort for correcting completely for market failures.
It is often argued that the decentralized economy without government intervention underinvests in R&D relatively to the social optimum. Based on quantitative exercises of comparing long run R&D shares, Jones and Williams (2000) reach this conclusion by evaluating the net-e ect of various R&D distortions. The R&D distortions can be grouped into distortions directly related to the production of ideas (knowledge spillovers in research, externalities associated with duplication, and creative destruction) and the surplus appropriability problem. By internalizing individual distortions one at a time, it is found that the main force promoting underinvestment in R&D comes from the surplus appropriability problem.
Underinvestments in R&D call for policy interventions. An important question is whether governments provide enough support for R&D activities to fully neutralize the distortions. Jones and Williams (1998) investigate this question and argue that conservative estimates imply that optimal R&D investments are at least two to four times higher than the actual level for the US economy. The analysis thus suggests that government spending is restricted.
The main question of this paper is whether it is optimal from a welfare perspective to influence the incentive to innovate using R&D subsidies when government spending is restricted or whether the government should rather use instruments dealing directly with the surplus appropriability problem. This will be addressed in a semi-endogenous growth model that follows Jones (1995) .
To make the analysis as focused as possible, technological spillovers are assumed to be absent in innovation activities and market power in production of goods created by innovation activities is the only distortion. Low demand due to market power, leads to low returns and thereby a low incentive to inno-vate. Hence, market power directly generates static ine ciency through low demand and indirectly dynamic ine ciency through low incentive to innovate.
A production subsidy a ects the static distortion of monopoly pricing only, whereas an R&D subsidy a ects the dynamic distortion of the incentive to innovate. By using optimal levels of the two subsidies, the government is able to simulate the economic outcome that a social planner who maximizes the utility of his representative household would choose. However, the required level of government spending for this optimal policy may be excessively high. Motivated by this result, the two subsidies are ranked according to welfare e ects for di erent levels of government spending. It is established that the R&D subsidy leads to higher welfare e ects when dynamic gains are important in relation to static gains. Hence, it may be optimal to focus entirely on correcting dynamic ine ciencies that arises from monopoly pricing.
A related issue is long run growth and government policies. Segerstrom (2000) finds that the long run growth e ect of R&D subsidies can be either negative or positive. 2 Another contribution is Peretto (2003) that focuses on long run growth e ects from di erent tax instruments, including a tax on corporate income that grants an implicit R&D subsidy. In this study, R&D subsidies are found to promote long run growth.
The models used in Segerstrom (2000) and Peretto (2003) are endogenous growth models without scale e ects where government policies potentially influence long run growth rates. This is not the case in the present study that is closer related to the models in Jones (1995) and Jones and Williams (2000) , which exhibit exogenous long run growth rates. Even though the analyses di er with respect to the relationship between long run growth and government policies, the qualitative results for the welfare e ects of R&D subsidies are likely to be similar across the di erent models. This will be the case when convergence to the balanced growth path is slow, implying that welfare in long run equilibrium may not generate important contributions to total welfare. In this paper, convergence is indeed found to be slow and it may take more than a century for the economy to adjust to the balanced growth path, implying that balanced growth welfare only have marginal e ects on total welfare. Second, the production function for innovation excludes technological spill-overs in the present setting, whereas these are included in both Peretto (2003) and Segerstrom (2000) . Technological spillovers are of course important and positive spillovers enhance the argument for using R&D subsidies. The main result of this paper is expected to strengthen if positive technological spillovers are introduced because R&D subsidies also directly corrects for such distortions, leading to even higher welfare e ects.
The Model
The applied model follows Romer (1990) and Jones (1995 
Final Goods
Final goods are produced according to: , whereas e ective intermediate input is given by the square bracket in (1). This specification implies that the productivity of a given aggregate quantity of intermediate goods increases with the number of specialized varieties.
Given the assumptions of perfect competition and profit-maximizing firms, the demand for the 'th intermediate variety and labor are determined by:
where is the price of intermediate variety and is the wage rate. The price of final goods is used as numeraire, i.e., = 1.
Intermediate Goods
To start business activities, the intermediate firm issues shares in order to finance the patent that is required for production. Monopolistic competition prevails in the intermediate goods sector and profits are accordingly paid to shareholders as dividends. The intermediate firm produces the specific variety by transforming final goods into intermediates one-to-one. Intermediate goods are perishables goods that are fully depreciated within the period of production. This is di erent from Jones (1995) and Romer (1990) that treat intermediates as capital goods but follows Grossman and Helpman (1991) . This formulation is applied to make the analysis more tractable. The producer of variety maximizes profits
. denotes a production subsidy that covers a share of production costs, i.e., the direct instrument to correct for monopoly power. The price of intermediate variety is accordingly determined by:
It is clear that the price of intermediate goods is the same across varieties, implying symmetric market clearing quantities for intermediate goods
Profits are thus identical for all producers of intermediate goods,
The usual non-arbitrage condition for shares in intermediate firms applies:
=˙ +¯
where is the patent price and a dot above a variable indicates the time derivative. The return to shares in intermediate firms is equal to the dividend plus capital gains.
Innovation
New designs are produced according to:
where is labor input in the activity. The applied technology in innovation is simpler than that applied by Jones (1995) or Jones and Williams (2000) , which incorporates replication e ects, creative destruction, and knowledge spillover.
The government subsidizes innovation using an R&D subsidy, , that covers a cost share of labor used in innovation activities. Profit in innovation is zero due to perfect competition, implying that the patent price equals:
Consequently, the non-arbitrage condition can be expressed as:
where indicates the growth rate of .
Household Sector
The household sector is characterized by a representative household with an infinite time horizon. Intertemporal preferences are described by the isoelastic utility integral:
where 0 is the rate of time preference, 0 is the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is exogenous population growth, and is consumption of final goods per capita, which equals aggregate consumption divided by the population, i.e., = where denotes the population. Utility is maximized subject to the dynamic budget constraint:
where is aggregate financial capital and denotes lump-sum taxes paid by households. The growth rate in consumption per capita is derived from the first-order conditions with respect to and = and is determined by:
where indicates the growth rate of . Finally, the transversality condition lim [ ] = 0 implies that 2 .
The Government
The government cannot borrow and as a result, it satisfies the budget constraint + =
where lump-sum taxes finance government spending. = ¯ and = denote levels of government spending under the two policy instruments.
Market Clearing
The equilibrium conditions for the intermediate markets are already imposed on the model. The labor market and final goods markets also have to clear. For the labor market it is assumed that a share of labor is employed in the final goods sector, whereas the remaining share (1 ) is employed in innovation, i.e., = and = (1 ) . The market clearing condition for final goods is derived to:
, (3), (5), (8), and the government's budget constraint.
is defined as
(1 ) 2 (1 ) Finally, the market for patents clears according to Walras' Law.
Balanced Growth Path
In the remainder of the paper, welfare e ects of production and R&D subsidies financed through domestic tax collection are investigated. The focal point is the case where government spending is restricted, i.e., below the required e ort for correcting completely for market failures. Hence, for some reason the government is unable or unwilling to use the level of spending required to implement the optimum policy. The exact mechanisms causing this restriction are not modeled formally and are not expected to change the main result if included.
Balanced growth welfare is compared under two policy experiments. In Experiment 1, the production subsidy is implemented with no R&D subsidy, i.e., 0, = 0, and = , whereas the R&D subsidy is implemented with no production subsidy in Experiment 2, i.e., = 0, 0, and = . Subsequently, welfare e ects including transitional dynamics of government policies are studied in Section 4.
Equilibrium
Under balanced growth, the number of intermediate varieties grows by . Using (6), the number of intermediate varieties is derived to = (1 ) where = , denotes the type of subsidy applied. The production subsidy lowers the intermediate price, which leads to an increase in intermediate demand, see (4) and (5). The higher demand increases profits for intermediate producers, and thereby the incentive to innovate. Moreover, the higher intermediate demand also increases labor demand and thereby the wage rate and the patent price, see (7) . The higher patent price reduces the incentive to innovate. The two opposite e ects exactly cancel out, implying that the production subsidy does not a ect the allocation of labor and thereby the number of intermediate varieties, i.e., = ( ) ( + ) and = ( + ). Consequently, the production subsidy only generates a direct static gain through the price of intermediate goods. 4 Using (12) it can be shown that the production subsidy a ects consumption through two e ects. First, the direct static e ect of gives rise to a higher use of the single intermediate variety as mentioned above. Second, a negative e ect from is generated through a higher level of government spending and thereby lump-sum taxation required to implement the higher subsidy level.
The R&D subsidy is targeted on the incentive to innovate and therefore leads to a direct dynamic gain. This instrument does not a ect the intermediate price and generates no static e ects. However, it distorts the patent price. Indirect policy responses usually introduce unintended distortions of incentives in other sectors of the economy. This is not the case in the present setting because the stock of patents is a sector-specific production factor. Substituting into the non-arbitrage condition in (8) leads to
4 Under the balanced growth path = + , which is derived from (11) . In this section, is often used instead of + to simplify the notation.
Consequently, the balanced growth share of labor employed in final goods production equals:
and the number of intermediate varieties follows
The lower patent price raises the incentive to innovate, which implies that labor is reallocated out of the final goods sector and into R&D activities leading to a higher stock of intermediate varieties. The positive e ect on the number of intermediate varieties dominates the negative e ect on the labor share in final goods production, i.e.,
increases. This implies that balanced growth consumption increases, see (12) .
The optimal level of the production subsidy equals = (1 ), since the distortion from monopoly pricing is fully eliminated and the purchasing price for intermediates equals the marginal cost of production. The optimal R&D subsidy equals = (1 ), implying a balanced growth number of intermediate varieties of = . By implementing both of these subsidies, the government simulates the economic outcome that a social planner who maximizes the utility of his representative household would choose. In the following, it is assumed that the government does not over-subsidize incentives. 5 The magnitude of the static gain compared to the magnitude of the dynamic gain can be summarized by:
The dynamic gain on balanced growth consumption from a change in ( ) increases in the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution, i.e., , and the rate of time preferences, i.e., , and 5 The government could also use a third policy instrument, a subsidy to intermediate purchase. This subsidy deals directly with the monopoly distortion by reducing the price of intermediate goods by covering a cost share of intermediate purchase. As for the production subsidy, this subsidy generates opposite e ects on the incentive to innovate. In this case, however, the positive e ect on the rate of return dominates the negative cost e ect, leading to a higher incentive to invest in innovation. The subsidy to intermediate purchase is a combination of the production subsidy and the R&D subsidy with = , implying that a subsidy to intermediate purchase of (1 ) fully eliminates the distortion from monopoly pricing and increases the number of intermediate varieties to the optimal level. This instrument is not investigated, since I want to focus on static and dynamic gains separately. Moreover, policies combining the production subsidy and the R&D subsidy in a less restrictive manner than = are investigated in Section 4 below. a ( ) decreases in the population growth rate, i.e., . The static gain on balanced growth consumption from a change in is not ected by changes in , or .
Proof. The static gain from a change in equals
which is positive for
(1 ) and independent of , , and . The dynamic gain from a change in equals
which is positive since 1 2 for (1 ). This can be shown using the transversality condition that 2 . The interest rate under the balanced growth path equals = + .
Because is positively related to , positively related to , and negatively related to , the dynamic e ect depends positively on the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
positively on rate of time preference
and negatively on population growth
This proves Proposition 1.¤ The higher is the rate of time preferences, i.e., , or the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution, i.e., , the larger is the dynamic gain of an R&D subsidy. Furthermore, the higher is population growth, i.e., , the lower is the dynamic gain. The relationships follow from the share of labor in final goods production. The higher is this share, the higher is the dynamic gain.
In other words, the lower is the share of labor employed in innovation, the larger is the dynamic gain from an R&D subsidy.
The intuition follows from the non-arbitrage condition, see (13) . The higher is or , the higher is the capital gain on R&D investments. The higher return is generated by higher demand for the single intermediate variety and thereby through a higher labor share employed in final goods production, see (5) . When increases two e ects are working on the share of labor in final goods production. First, ( ) = ( 1) + is a ected and the sign of this e ect depends on 1. Second, is a ected through . The mechanism is that = (1 ) decreases when increases everything else equal, leading to a lower marginal product of labor in final goods production. This implies a lower wage rate and thereby a lower patent price. The lower patent price increases the incentive to innovate, leading to a higher share of labor in the activity, i.e., decreases. The latter e ect on dominates such that falls when increases.
Government Spending
Government spending per capita equals
under the production subsidy, whereas it equals
under the R&D subsidy.
Proposition 2 The levels of government spending in relation to final goods output equal:
, where subscript indicates that both subsidies are implemented.
Proof. Final goods production equals
(1 ) 2 (1 ) where = and = . Moreover, final goods production equals
when is implemented separately and
when is implemented separately. The levels of government spending appear from (16) and (17). = (1 ) (1 ) that is rewritten using the non-arbitrage condition in (13). Proposition 2 is proved using = (1 ) and/or = (1 ).¤
The implication of Proposition 2 is that ( + ) potentially is excessively high. It is seen that government spending in relation to output decreases in and and increases in under the R&D subsidy, whereas the ratio is una ected by changes in these parameters under the production subsidy. These results follow from the non-arbitrage condition (13) and the intuition is given in the discussion in relation to Proposition 1. Moreover,
Hence, when dynamic gains are su ciently important, i.e., when and are su ciently high and is su ciently low, the required level of government spending to implement the optimal subsidy level of the production subsidy exceeds that of the R&D subsidy that completely correct for the dynamic ine ciency.
Welfare
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that the welfare ranking of production and R&D subsidies under restricted government spending depends on the parameters , , and . The higher is and and the lower is , the higher is the dynamic gain of R&D subsidies (Proposition 1) and the lower is the level of government spending in relation to output required to correct completely for dynamic ine ciencies (Proposition 2). Consequently, when = + is above a critical level it seems plausible that the balanced growth e ect on welfare of an R&D subsidy will exceed that of a production subsidy under restricted government spending. If this is confirmed, it is relevant to analyze whether the total welfare e ect, i.e., when the transitional dynamics are incorporated in the analysis, may be larger under the R&D subsidy than the production subsidy.
In this section I investigate whether the R&D subsidy can lead to higher balanced growth welfare than the production subsidy. The analysis is carried out under the restriction that levels of government spending in the two experiments are equal. Balanced growth consumption per capita is used interchangeably for balanced growth welfare even though consumption is not synonymous with welfare. It can be the case that the sacrifice in consumption that the households have to su er in the short-to median-run is too large for what is socially optimal. The analysis, however, is carried out for relatively low subsidy levels, implying that an increase in the subsidy will lead to an increase in welfare.
The requirement that the balanced growth levels of government spending are of similar magnitude in the two experiments, i.e., = 1, implies
This equation is derived using , , , , (16), and (17). Furthermore, the balanced growth consumption levels are equal across the two experiments, i.e., = 1, if
(1 )
holds. This equation is derived using , , , , and (12). (18) and (19) are complex function of and . When a -value is chosen, the values of that ensure similar levels of government spending and consumption levels under the two experiments are determined.
The two relationships are used to investigate whether the R&D subsidy can lead to a higher balanced growth welfare e ect than the production subsidy. More precisely, I investigate whether 1 is a possible outcome for = 1. To do this (18) and (19) are expressed as graphs in the ( )-space.
1 holds for = 1 if the = 1-curve is located above the = 1-curve. Below I show that this is a possible outcome for the two cases = 0 and 0.
Analysis for = 0
The = 1-curve is possibly located above the = 1-curve for = 0:
Proposition 3 ( ) The = 1-curve and the = 1-curve pass through the origin. ( ) For ( ) = (0 0), the = 1-curve is steeper that the = 1-curve when = + where
Proof. It is easy to verify that the = 1-and the = 1-curves pass through origin by setting = 0 in (18) and (19). This proves Proposition 3 . Proposition 3 is proved in Appendix A4.¤
The main insight from Proposition 3 is that the introduction of a small R&D subsidy may imply a larger impact on balanced growth consumption than the comparable production subsidy. Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 1 .
The curve shows values of for (0 1). When = + attains a value larger than , the balanced growth welfare e ect of the R&D subsidy is larger than the production subsidy for small subsidy levels. Hence, the higher is or and the lower is , the higher is and thereby the more likely it is that a small R&D subsidy results in a larger welfare e ect than a production subsidy. The production subsidy generates a higher balanced growth welfare e ect when is below .
Analysis for 0
The = 1-curve is possibly located above the = 1-curve for 0. The closed form solutions for the two curves are presented in Appendixes A2 and A3. The two curves have positive slopes and can be convex or concave. The functions for the two curves are highly complex and it is not possible to describe the characteristics of these analytically. Therefore, the two curves are analyzed numerically. More precisely, the di erence between the R&D subsidies that satisfy = 1 and = 1 for a given value of the production subsidy is investigated. If this di erence is positive it is more e cient to subsidize R&D activities. Three possible outcomes for the di erence between the R&D subsidies are presented in Figure 2 . Panel presents the case where the production subsidy always leads to the largest balanced growth welfare e ect. Proposition 3 does not hold in this case, i.e., = + . When Proposition 3 applies, i.e., = + , two outcome are possible as shown in Panels and . Panel presents the case where the R&D subsidy leads to a higher balanced growth welfare e ect for relatively low and the production subsidy leads to a higher balanced growth welfare e ect for relatively high subsidy levels. Finally, Panel presents the case where the R&D subsidy always leads to a higher balanced growth welfare e ect.
The main result established in this section is that an R&D subsidy increases balanced growth consumption more than a production subsidy under restricted government spending for a relatively high rate of return, i.e., the dynamic gain is high when = + is high. The intuition follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that states that the dynamic gain from policy intervention is high compared to the static gain and that government spending required to correct for dynamic ine ciency is relatively low when = + is high. The natural next step is to investigate whether the R&D subsidy can generate higher welfare e ects that the production subsidy when the transitional dynamics is taken into account. This issue is addressed in the next section.
Transitional Dynamics and Total Welfare
To measure total welfare e ects under the two policy experiments, the transitional dynamics of the model is simulated using the "Time-Elimination Method", see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991 1993) . Furthermore, the dynamic equivalent variation, , is applied to measure welfare e ects. Figure 3 . The figure confirms that the production subsidy generates static e ects only. Panel shows that the allocation of labor across sectors is una ected by the subsidy. The reason is that the incentive to innovate is una ected implying an unchanged rate of return, see Panel . Consequently, the consumption profile of this subsidy is described as a one time increase in consumption at time zero where the subsidy is implemented.
The R&D subsidy generates dynamic e ects because the incentive to invest in R&D increases. It is evident from Panel that the rate of return increases on impact. This reflects that the patent price falls when R&D is subsidized, see (8) . The higher incentive to innovate implies reallocation of labor out of final goods production and into R&D implying that falls. Consumption falls on impact when labor is reallocated to R&D activities but increases over time to a new and higher consumption level in the medium and long run as a consequence of the increasing number of intermediate varieties.
The issue of interest is whether the consumption profile under the R&D subsidy leads to higher welfare than the production subsidy. To evaluate this, the dynamic equivalent variation is presented in Table 1 for combinations of the parameter values = 0 5%, 1%, and 2%, = 0 04 and 0 08, = 0 5 and 2, and = 0 333 and 0 5. It is evident that the R&D subsidy may generate a larger e ect on total welfare than the production subsidy. For the baseline experiment ( = 0 5%, = 0 04, = 2 and = 0 5), the total welfare e ect of the R&D subsidy, , is 3 37. This welfare e ect is 1 34 times larger than the welfare e ect for the production subsidy, i.e., = 1 34. According to Propositions 1 and 2, the R&D subsidy leads to relatively large balanced growth welfare e ects for low , high and high values. It is seen from Table 1 that the total welfare e ect is relatively large for high values of and low values of . For these parameters, the result from the balanced growth analysis carries over to the total welfare analysis. However, the balanced growth e ect of does not necessarily carry over. Based on the balanced growth analysis, it is expected that an increase in increases welfare of the R&D subsidy in relation to the production subsidy. However, higher tends to reduce the relative size of for the R&D subsidy. The understanding of this result is that households are less willing to vary consumption for high . This implies that the sacrifice in consumption that the households have to su er in the short-to median-run under the R&D subsidy leads to a relative large negative e ect on welfare. An exemption is for = 2% and = 0 04 where the balanced growth e ect of changing dominates. To investigate whether it is more e cient to use policies combining the two subsidies instead of using all government funds to one subsidy only, government funds are divided between the two subsidies in constant shares. The levels of the two subsidies are accordingly determined by = ¯ and = (1 ) . The results are presented in Figure 4 . As in Table 1 , initial government spending equals 1% of initial production of final goods. In Panel , internal solutions applies, implying that both intermediate production and innovation activities should be subsidized. The lower is , the larger is the share that should be targeted on innovation activities. Panel presents two cases where the government should use the R&D subsidy only, i.e., = 0 5% Note: EV is the dynamic equivalent variation relative to wealth at time zero when the combined policy consisting of the R&D subsidy and the subsidy to intermediate production is implemented. 
and
= 1%. Actually, the dynamic gain is so pronounced that welfare increases if intermediate production is taxed. This is seen by the fact that welfare is maximized for spending shares on R&D above 1. The explanation is that the loss in welfare from higher static ine ciency is more than outweighed by the dynamic gain. Moreover, it is e cient from a welfare perspective to subsidize intermediate production and tax innovation activities, i.e., = 2%. Figure 5 presents the welfare e ects for di erent levels of government spending. It is seen that internal solutions apply when the level of government spending is increased. Even though the government should use the R&D subsidy only and may even want to tax intermediate goods production for low levels of government spending, positive levels of both subsidies should be applied when the restriction on government spending is relaxed. The intuition is that the marginal dynamic gain of the R&D subsidy is lower than the marginal static gain of the production subsidy under an R&D subsidy only policy when the level of spending exceeds a critical level. Hence, the government should combine the two subsidies when the government spending level is relatively high.
Concluding Remarks
This paper argues that it may be optimal from a welfare perspective to directly subsidize R&D activities when the source of R&D distortions mainly originates from the surplus appropriability problem. This result holds when two conditions are fulfilled: (1) dynamic gains are important relative to static gains and (2) governments spend less resources than the required e ort for correcting completely for R&D distortions.
The applied model is a semi-endogenous growth model, see for example Jones (1995) . Monopoly power generates a distortion in pricing of intermediate goods, which calls for policy intervention. Subsidies to the production of intermediate goods and subsidies to R&D activities are analyzed. The former has a direct e ect on the distortion of monopoly pricing. The other instrument covers part of R&D costs and has no direct e ect on the distortion of monopoly pricing.
The main question of the paper is whether the R&D subsidy generates a higher welfare e ect than a production subsidy under restricted government spending. This may be the case, suggesting that the government can generate higher welfare by focusing entirely on the dynamic ine ciencies. Note: EV is the dynamic equivalent variation relative to wealth at time zero when the combined policy consisting of the R&D subsidy and the subsidy to intermediate production is implemented. 
A The Solution to the Model
The solution of the model is given by (6), (8) , (11), (12) , the government's budget and the transversality condition lim [ ] = 0, where is the co-state variable associated to financial capital. Without subsidies, the equilibrium can be expressed as:
where
and grows with a constant exogenous growth rate, .
In the main text, two experiments are investigated. In Experiment 1, the direct instrument is implemented with no R&D subsidy, i.e., 0, = 0, and the R&D subsidy is implemented with no direct instrument in Experiment 2, i.e., = 0, 0. The balanced growth equilibria under Experiments 1 and 2 appear from (14), (15), and (12). 
A.1 Stability of the Balanced Growth Path

¸
The determinant of can be expressed as:
For stability of the system the determinant of the Jacobian has to be negative. By substituting for balanced growth values, the determinant is rewritten to ( ) ( + ) that is negative. Consequently, the balanced growth equilibrium is saddle-path stable. Using numerical experiments the equilibria with subsidies implemented are shown to be saddle-path stable.
A.2 = 1-curve
The function = 1, presented in (18) has two possible solutions each: The slope of ( ) is always positive.
A.3 = 1-curve
The function = 1, presented in (19) has two possible solutions: It can be shown that the relevant solution is 1 + . This is proven by showing that 1 , implying that 1 , which is irrelevant in the analysis because R&D is over-subsidized in this case.
The slope of the = 1-curve is derived using (23):
where 0 ( ) ( ) = 1 1
The slope of ( ) is positive for (1 ).
A.4 Proposition 3
The slope of the = 1-curve for = = 0 equals
which is derived using (24), whereas the slope of the = 1-curve for = = 0 equals
The slope is derived from (22) using (18) to solve for the limit value of . Define = . The slope of the = 1-curve is equal to the slope of the = 1-curve for
2
(1 + (1 + )) ( 1) = 0
Two roots solve this equation. The negative root can be excluded, since 2 according to the transversality condition. The relevant root is the positive root labelled . When , the slope of the = 1-curve is larger than the slope of the = 1-curve. This proves Proposition 3 . The positive root is presented in the proposition.
A.5 Dynamic Equivalent Variation
The intertemporal budget constraint: 0 is the present value of labor income, 0 is non-human wealth at time 0, and 0 is the present value of tax payments. 
The dynamic equivalent variation is defined as follows:
The superscript denotes the case when a subsidy is implemented. denotes the initial situation described by laissez-faire balanced growth path. This yields the equivalent variation:
